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he Gulf War created one of the largest single man-made disasters in history,
oil fires greater in number than all previous well fires added together, and
slicks more than two to three times the size of the world's previously largest oil spill.
Damage to the coastal and desert ecology of southern Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi
Arabia-from the fires and spills, from military fortifications and land mines, from
attacks on oil and petrochemical installations, and then from intense operations by
two of the largest tank armies ever assembled-produced widespread destruction and
disrupted a fragile balance. Routine movements and encampments produced solid
waste on a huge scale. Oil fires produced historically unequaled emissions of
hydrocarbons. An otherwise vibrant and fertile Euphrates River valley was damaged
by a breakdown of irrigation and agricultural systems, and continues to deteriorate
due to ongoing Iraqi ecocide practices in response to insurgency.l
Environmental damage provoked a torrent of speeches, legal briefs and journal
articles, conferences and meetings; intense lobbying by environmental and
humanitarian organizations; was the subject of proposals for a "Fifth" Geneva
Convention and other new protections; was discussed extensively in the Sixth
Committee of the United Nations General Assembly in 1991 and 1992; deliberated
by an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Experts Group; on the
agenda at the United Nations Council for Economic Development (UNCED);
considered in the U.S. Government's review ofIraqi war crimes; and included in
the Pentagon's final report to Congress on conduct of the war. "Data" about the
oil spills and fires even has its own place on the Internet.
On the surface, all the huffing and puffing has produced little. Before the war,
the Bush Administration in National Security Directive 54 (NSD-54) designated
destruction of Kuwait's oil resources as one of three "unconscionable acts" (along
with the use of chemical and biological weapons and acts of international
terrorism) for which the Iraqi leadership would be held personally responsible.
President Bush's eleventh hour letter to Saddam Hussein forcefully threatened a
"terrible price" in retaliation. 2
Governments such as Jordan were early doomsayers about the environmental
threat, agitating strongly for action after the war. But politics intruded and they
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subsequently retreated, not wanting to condemn their resilient and powerful
neighbor. Nor did Kuwait or Saudi Arabia formally "charge" Iraq. Neither wanted
to further fan the flames, nor potentially open up their own half-hearted clean-up
efforts and environmental practices to greater outside scrutiny.
Yet war crimes have not been pursued and since Operation Desert Storm, U.S.
Government lawyers (and those of most other developed nations) have argued that
the problem is neither scope nor shortcomings in international law but compliance
and enforcement of existing law.3 International "political-strategic"
considerations thus take priority over protection of the environment. In this
regard, it could be said that advances of the last two decades in environmental
accountability have been superseded by a version of "supreme national interest."
Which is to say, if a credible scenario for reverberating environmental destruction
on a global scale could be postulated, then likely the conduct ofwarfare would take
precedence over the potential widespread harm.
The environmental calamity and lack offormallegal action in the Gulf War
may thus seem an odd context in which to claim that environmental protection
has advanced, yet the true story of the war is one of a high degree of sensitivity to
environmental destruction by both sides, and at least by one, significant
self-imposed constraints, many corresponding to the very restrictions that
Coalition government lawyers eschew. The environmental issue was "used" by
both sides in a cynical way, but public visibility of the environmental dimension
ofwarfare was also highly influential. Though Iraq's destruction went unpunished,
if there is a silver lining, it is that it and other environmentally destructive practices
that Pentagon lawyers otherwise condone have essentially become "outlawed" in
common practice.
For the American side, much of the history regarding political constraints on
air power and ground operations remains shrouded in secrecy. The reason seems
obvious: Government lawyers and military planners have little interest in seeing
public expectations codified as new combat doctrine, policy, or law.
I remember having an argument with a military lawyer in 1992 as to whether
the U.S. Marine Corps even used napalm in the air war. The lawyer asserted that
they did not, and I told him that I had Marine Corps documents specifying how
many and by which airplanes. His denial is instructive about the real impact
environmental and humanitarian considerations have on US military operations.
Though napalm is not an "illegal" weapons per se, its employment for particular
purposes probably no longer is possible without provoking negative publicity. So
public announcements of its use are suppressed, even denied.
Napalm was "tried" as a weapon in the Gulf War, as were fuel air explosives,
mostly to aid in the breach ofIraqi defenses and to overcome minefields and fire
trenches. For these purposes, the weapons did not make much of an impression,
and their value to commanders in comparison with other weapons did not exceed
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the potential public outcry that might have resulted from their use, particularly
as anti-personnel weapons (even against enemy soldiers).
The use of napalm is just one example of where the gap between
political/public-relations constraints and "legal" constraints seems to be growing.
The result can be strange justification for the "need" to bomb targets that are
otherwise politically stigmatized. Take dams for instance. Though legitimate
targets,4 because of their potential for unleashing enormously destructive forces
on the civilian population, they acquired political sensitivity through the Korean
and Vietnam wars, so much so that their attack is generally restricted even in U.S.
military doctrine. 5
The bombing of Iraqi dams was suggested early on as a punitive measure,
potentially in response to the use of chemical weapons, but was rejected. 6 No
prohibitions per se against hitting hydroelectric power stations collocated at dams
were incorporated into Operation Desert Storm rules of engagement.
Nevertheless, military lawyers argued that in such attacks, dams and dikes would
have to be avoided "for humanitarian/political reasons." Little more arose on the
subject until after the war. Then the same lawyers counseled that dams and dikes
should be bombed in future conflicts, less the option to bomb them be lost in some
legal prohibition that merely follows common practice?
The cases of napalm and dams are instructive. For regardless of official
"legality," there are a set of weapons and targets that now seem to be particularly
"controversial," receiving a disproportionate degree of attention in the news
media, and within the humanitarian community. Weapons include napalm, fuel
air explosives, depleted uranium, cluster bombs, anti-personnel mines, riot control
agents, incendiaries, and blinding lasers. Targets that have acquired negative
repute, mostly because of adverse human or environmental effects, include water,
dams, nuclear power plants, electrical power, oil and petrochemical facilities, as
well as other civilian utilities.
It is important to establish from the beginning that the environment does not
just mean trees, or birds, or water. It is the natural surroundings that support
human life. Within the intricacies of international law and practice,
environmental protection is increasingly and inextricably a part of human rights
law: "It is now recognized that personal growth and happiness-fundamental
human rights-cannot be achieved in a severely damaged environment."s
Some theorists in the military-prophets of "information" or "parallel"
warfare-assert military benefit behind the reverberating impact of destruction of
interconnected systems. Yet loss of electricity (or computer networks) is not just
relevant for its speculative second- or third-order potential to disable air defenses
and command and control. The first order effect on water purification and
distribution, and the resulting environmental and direct harm to human health,
is of greater consequence.

Arkin

119

In this paper, I examine more closely three environmental issues which bear
upon the conflict between the ethic of protection and military necessity. In the
case of oil fires and spills, I argue that the lack ofinternational action to hold Iraq
responsible weakens the existing standards of protection. I argue that the reason
for lack of action on the part of the United States is that responsibility for the oil
damages proved more complicated than the popular charge of "environmental
terror" suggested. In the case of destruction of electricity, I argue that the concept
of "collateral damage" needs to be expanded, given the ability of military
technology to limit direct but not indirect effects of destruction on systems
indispensable for the survival of the civilian population. I then look at the set of
stigmatized weapons and speculate that their reputation is born not just of
particular cruelty or suffering, but because of a sense of their "toxicity" and
long-term damage. The emotional debate regarding the "Gulf War syndrome"
should prove instructive with regards to the many unknowns and risks that lurk
behind new technology. In fact, the public conscience seems a finer gauge of the
"legality" or "desirability" of new weapons than does the formal review process
undertaken by Pentagon lawyers.

Spills, Fires, and Dilution of International Law
Environmental damage in the Gulf War occurred both as a result of acts of
deliberate destruction and malice, and as an unintentional byproduct of military
activity. The vast majority of the fires and spills were the result ofIraqi sabotage
of Kuwait's oil industry. But Coalition military action contributed.9
In December 1990, Iraqi engineers detonated six oil wells and ignited basins of
oil in Kuwait, practicing procedures for the subsequent larger scale destruction.
Iraq then packed wellheads with plastic explosives, linking them together with
electrical and mechanical detonators. On 21 January, less than a week after the .
start of the air war, 60 wells in and around Al Wafrah in southern Kuwait were
exploded. At about the same time, refineries and storage tanks at Mina ash
Shuaybah and Mina Abd Allah, on the coast south of Kuwait City, were also set
ablaze. On the eve of the ground war, on or about 22 February, Iraq started to
d.etonate the remaining wellheads, the majority centered in the Al Burgan oil field
south of the Kuwait International Airport.
In all, Iraq destroyed 732 wells,10 20 oil and gas gathering stations,l1 and
damaged four refineries,12 as well as downstream oil facilities such as gathering
manifolds, tank farms, pipelines, and ofiloading facilities. Two of four natural gas
booster stations were also damaged. Of the 732 sabotaged wells, 650 were set aflame,
and 82 were damaged sufficiently to cause them to gush oil uncontrollably.B
Fires, as well as large amounts ofoil exposed to the natural environment, created
noxious gases and massive amounts of inhalable particles. At the height of the
fires, the amount of soot emitted was estimated at 5000 tons per day, the equivalent
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of 46 million heavy-duty diesel trucks, roughly nine times the number in the
United States, driving at 30 miles per hour. 14 The last well fire was extinguished
on 6 November 1991. But that is not the end of the story.
What really happened in the rapidly moving and confusing war? On the first
morning of the air war, U.S. Navy planes bombed an Iraqi oil platform and loading
terminal in the northern Gulf at Mina Al Bakr, evidently creating the first oil slick.
On the seventh day of the air war (23 January), U.S. Navy aircraft struck the Iraqi
tanker Amuriyah while underway in the northern Gulf, as it was refueling a
Winchester class air-cushioned landing craft. The resulting secondary explosions
destroyed the tanker. That same day, anAl Qadisiyah-class tanker moored on the
coast of Kuwait was also destroyed by French aircraft. Two days later, two oil slicks
were reported in the Gulf, one in the vicinity of where theAmuriyah was sunk, and
the other at the Sea Island terminal off the coast of Kuwait. Intelligence analysts
believed the second slick had been started by Iraq, and oil from the terminal
quickly extended down the coast of Saudi Arabia.
On 25 January, U.S. Navy units engaged an Iraqi mine-laying vessel near the
Sea Island terminal, setting a part of the terminal and surrounding water afire.
Another oil slick was identified further north on the Kuwait coast on 26 January.
It was evidently the result of Coalition bombing of the Ras al Qulayah naval base
and surrounding facilities. Oil continued to leak from the Mina Al Bakr terminal
and theAmuriyah tanker nearby. On 27 January, U.S. Navy aircraft engaged two
additional tankers riding high in the water northeast of the Bubiyan Island
channel. Both tankers were struck and one was later reported aground and leaking
oil on the north bank of the Khorr Abd Allah. A pipe on the southern tip of
Bubiyan Island, originating in the Rawdatayn oil field in northern Kuwait, was
also observed leaking oil, evidently from Coalition bombing. The tanker Hittin
was reported on fire at the Mina Al Ahmadi north pier on 28 January. On 2
February, intelligence observers reported that a slick emanating from the northern
Gulfwas growing larger; origin unknown.
I go through this somewhat confusing and highly abbreviated chronology
because the official story looks very different. What the public heard during the war
was that around 19 January, Iraq opened valves at the Sea Island terminal, pumping
oil directly into the Gulf: Soon after the start of allied military action, moored Iraqi
tankers south of Kuwait City also supposedly began discharging oil into the Gulf:
There is no mention of their being bombed, or of other tankers being targeted. The
Saudi oil storage facility and refinery at Al Khafji, just south of the Kuwaiti border,
was shelled by Iraqi artillery, and it began to leak oil. Saudi oil platforms were
damaged by drifting Iraqi sea mines. Later, Iraqi tankers anchored northeast of
Bubiyan Island also began expelling oil, but again no mention of the attacks by
Coalition aircraft. Damaged Kuwaiti refineries and oil tanks along the coast are not
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revealed. Many of these were the objects of aircraft bombing and intense naval
gunfire. The combined spill was eventually, estimated at 7-9 million barrels.
The considerable fallout from the oil-fire smoke plume immediately effected
public health, and ultimately damaged significant land and water areas. Because
the plume remained between 1500 and 13,000 feet, and was never detected above
18,000 feet, the global spread in the upper atmosphere was minimized.
Nevertheless, smoke had a regional climatic effect-area surface temperatures
were below normal by as much as 10 degrees Fahrenheit in 1991. There was a
decline in agricultural productivity in the region, as well as increased animal
mortalities due to ingestion of oil-tainted vegetation. Oil continued to leak into
the Gulf from a number of sources until late Mayor early June, adding as much
as one-half million barrels beyond the end of the war. Eventually, oil fouled 400
miles of Saudi coastline, inundating salt marshes and tidal areas with oil, and
killing marine life and diving birds.
There is little evidence that Coalition attacks on tankers or oil targets balanced
military necessity against whatever environmental damage might occur. But the
bombing of tankers was an internally controversial matter. Indeed, while some
planners and commanders outside the Navy argued that tankers were off limits,
the top Navy commander argued that they were as legitimate as electrical power
or other civilian utilities. IS
In the end, Iraqi environmental destruction dwarfed the various U.S.
contributions, but war crimes were not pursued for various forensic reasons, and the
full story of the destruction of oil could not be told for fear of implicating the United
States. Pentagon lawyers asserted that the 1977 Environmental Modification
Convention (the ENMOD Convention),16 and 1977 Additional Protocol I to the
Geneva Conventions I7 ''were not legally applicable in the Persian GulfWar.,,18 What
is more, they concluded that even had Additional Protocol I been in force, the damage
would not have applied because it did not reach the required legal threshold. 19 The
U.S. Government even stated in its environmental report to Congress that Iraqi
actions "were probably done to slow or prohibit an amphibious landing of Coalition
forces in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia,,,20 thus giving credence to future justifications of
environmental destruction as having military purpose. However, as all the evidence
shows, the Iraqi actions were acts of pure destruction where the military implications
were secondary or even inadvertent. The Iraqis knew that they were destroying the
environment. Indeed, there is evidence to indicate that they thought that their actions
would have an even greater impact.

Destruction of Electricity and Redefining Collateral Damage
Before the Gulf War, destruction of electrical power production in warfare had
been pursued with varying effects yet with identical results: The nullification of
electrical energy was a minor, if not inconsequential, incumbrance to military
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operations. Though some argue that the Gulf War was a significant departure
from previous experiences, the military impact seems to be no different than
World War II, Korea, or Vietnam. Sufficient damage was done to the national
grid to essentially cause a nationwide blackout within a week of the U.N.
deadline, but military capabilities powered by central electrical grids were also
the object of intense direct attack and they were degraded mostly because of
that direct bombing, not because they lost power. Coalition electronic warfare
and countermeasures efforts, and suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD)
directed against modern electronic accoutrements of war were also
unprecedented in their scope and intensity, further diminishing the unique
and circumscribed impact ("non-lethal") of destroying electrical power.21
Though the destruction of electricity was pursued honestly as a means to effect
Iraq's air defenses and command, control, communications, and intelligence
(C3I), and may have helped to paralyze Iraqi armed forces, the civilian impact
outweighed the military benefit.
Iraqi electricity was largely cut throughout the country starting from the first
night of the war (17 January) and production did not resume until the late
March-April time frame. Iraqi officials state that allied bombing knocked out 7S
percent of the country's electrical generating plants. Unanticipated by air
planners,22 the civilian life-support system was brought to a halt, and everything
from heating and air conditioning;' to water supply, purification and sewage
treatment; to medical care was interrupted. In March 1991, United Nations envoy
Martii Ahtisaari reported on the civilian effects of electrical bombing:
The role of energy in Iraq is especially important because of the level of its
urbanization (approximately 72 per cent of the population lives in towns and cities),
its industrialization, and its prolonged, very hot summers.

Ahtisaari's U.N. field mission found that, "all previously viable sources offuel
and power (apart from a limited number of mobile generators) ... are now,
essentially, defunct .... Additionally, there is much less than the minimum fuel
required to provide the energy needed for movement or transportation, irrigation,
or power generators to pump water and sewage." Iraq's biggest recovery problem
in the post-war period was the destruction of its energy and power resources-lOan
omnipresent obstacle to the success of even a short-term, massive effort to
maintain life-sustaining conditions in each area of humanitarian need.1023 "Iraq in
recent years had become a high-tech society dependent on electric power generation
for irrigation, medical services, communications and industry," another early field
report concluded.24
Electrical bombing proved one of the most controversial aspects of Gulf War
bombing,25 and the Defense Department, in its Final Report to Congress on the
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Conduct of the Gulf War, explained the purpose and reasoning behind the attacks.
The destruction of electricity, it said,
had a cascading effect, reducing or eliminating the reliable supply of electricity
needed to power NBC weapons production facilities, as well as other war-supporting
industries; to refrigerate bio-toxins and some CW agents; to power the computer
systems required to integrate the air defense network; to pump fuel and oil from
storage facilities into trucks, tanks, and aircraft; to operate reinforced doors at aircraft
storage and maintenance facilities; and to provide the lighting and power for
maintenance, planning, repairs, and the loading of bombs and explosive agents. This
increased Iraqi use ofless reliable backup power generators which, generally, are slow
to come on line, and provide less power. Taken together, the synergistic effect of
losing primary electrical power sources in the first days of the war helped reduce
Iraq's ability to respond to Coalition attacks. The early disruption of electrical power
undoubtedly helped keep Coalition casualties low.26

It was a laundry list of potential and postulated effects, but not a report of
observed or provable impact.
From the beginning, the military recognized the intimate connection between
destruction of electricity and the livelihood of the civilian population. "Because
of our interest in making sure that civilians did not suffer unduly," General
Norman Schwarzkopf stated on 30 January, "we felt we had to leave some of the
electrical power in effect, and we've done that.,,27
Air war planners made attempts to limit the overall impact of shutting down the
electrical system on the civilian population, focusing targeting on distribution as
opposed to generation subsystems, and limiting the amount ofdestruction at harder
to repair generating facilities. Because of confusion in the target guidance and the
normal fog of war, the limitations were not followed. In addition, planners were
wrong in their assumption of rapid u.s. or international intervention because of
Iraq's defeat to repair the utility. The effect on the civilian population was
unprecedented.
The Gulf War Air Power Survey CGWAPS) concluded that nullification of
electrical power was achieved with "remarkably little collateral damage.,,28
Collateral damage, here defmed as incidental and unintended civilian casualties
sustained in the course of attacks, was indeed extremely low. Ignored, however, is
the far more injurious secondary collateral damage caused by accurate attacks. The
air war spared Iraqis from the indiscriminate effects of urban bombing, yet
efficiently disabled society's support systems, with the attendant short- and
long-term impact. Civilian harm was compounded by the fact that civilians were
otherwise spared the direct effects of bombing in the highly discriminate
"strategic" bombing campaign. The result magnified the electrical effect.
Electricity is so important to modern societies that attacks that could have
severe effects on the noncombatant population should be prohibited. The U.S.
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government accepts as customary law, as codified in Additional Protocol I, the
prohibition on the deliberate starvation of civilians, and the intentional
destruction of food, crops, livestock, and other objects indispensable to their
survival. The U.S. also does not object to Article 54 of Additional Protocol I which
protects "drinking water installations.,,29
But these restriction do not extend to destruction of installations that could
result in identical secondary effects. Thus, the destruction of dual-purpose power
grids are not restricted from attack. The ICRC list of categories of objectives of
"generally recognized military importance" created in 1956 included:
installations providing energy mainly for national defense ... plants producing gas
or electricity mainly for military consumption.30
The U.S. defended the right to attack integrated power grids as legitimate
31
targets throughout the negotiation of the Additional Protocols. U.S. negotiator
Ambassador George Aldrich noted that "of course we knew about power grids and
of course we were not going to agree to a provision that prohibited attacks on key
elements of power grids." Aldrich says attacks are allowed on power
stations-including nuclear reactors-that service central grids because the grid
itself is an example of "regular, significant and direct support of military
operations" as defined under Additional Protocol 1.32
Yet proof of "definite military advantage" required by the customary law
defmition of Article 52 of Additional Protocol I is difficult. Writing recently in
The Journal ofStrategic Studies, a former "Checkmate" Gulf War planner concludes
that while the destruction of the Iraqi electric grid
almost certainly had a significant impact on several key Iraqi subsystems, the
specifics are still unknown. Until we get much greater access to Iraqi officials and
documents we will not know how badly the loss of the electric grid hurt the Iraqi C3
network, its NBC research and development complex, or air defense system.33
The author argues in the forthcoming "Power Failure: Destruction of
Electricity in the Gulf War," based upon extensive research in Iraq, that in fact
destruction of electricity had negligible military advantage for the United States.
Indeed, destruction of any target must also be shown not to be "excessive" in
relation to whatever military advantage is being sought. Destruction of civilian
electrical power generation is thus a violation of the prohibitions in customary
international law against "any military operation which is not directed against a
legitimate military target or which can be expected to cause incidental death,
injury or damage to civilians that is clearly excessive in relation to the direct
military advantage of the operation.,,34
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Toxicity on the Battlefield
The Gulf War witnessed the most extensive and widespread use of submunitions
in the history of conflict, the first combat use of depleted uranium weapons, and
large-scale mining both on land and at sea. The result was a significantly increased
explosive ordnance disposal and battlefield remnants problem.35 Ironically, while
Iraqi use of mines and the land mine problem has received the majority of attention,
cluster bombs were far more injurious and damaging, and depleted uranium far more
emotionally and symbolically important.
Cluster bombs and land mines (often called "grenades" in ground-delivered
weapons and "bomblets" in air-delivered weapons)36 are nothing new, and they
hardly received the attention in the Gulf War reserved for smart weapons. Most
people are even unaware of what submunitions are, let alone that they constituted
a quarter of the weapons dropped by aircraft. Some 61,000 were expended, totaling
some 20 million bomblets (Table 1).37
Table 1
Air-delivered Cluster Bomb Expenditure in the Gulf War
~

Efflli

United States
CBU-52/58/71
CBU-59
CBU-78
CBU-87
CBU-89
Mk20 Rockeye

£uhImal
Allied
BL-755
CBU-87

£uhImal
ThIal

Numb!:[ EXll!:od!:d
Air Force

Frag
APAM
Gator
CEM
Gator
AA

21,696"

Navy

Marines

°
10,035°
1,105

°°
°°
6,814

°
°°
16,014

38,181

6,962

16,261

5,345

148

186
61

61,404

RAF
8
387
395
61,799b

AA: anti-armor with poor fragmentation and incendiary capability; APAM; anti-personnel!
anti-materiel; CEM: Combined effects munitions (light anti-armor and anti-personnel);
Frag: incendiary/fragmentation bomblet with no anti-armor effect; Gator: air-delivered
magnetically fused heavy anti-tank and tripwire anti-personnel mines.
• Sources vary on the number ofCBU-52158nl cluster bombs expended, some stating
17,831. The higher official number was chosen; see GWAPS, Vol. III, Part I, at 234 & 256.
Does not include a complete count of allied use of cluster bombs, particularly French
and Saudi. The BL-755 is a British-manufactured cluster bomb.

b

Sources: U.S. Department of the Air Force, Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS),
Volume III, Part I, p. 235, Volume IV, Part I, p. 65, Volume V, Part I, pp. 550-552;
House of Commons, Preliminary Lessons o/Operation Granby Guly 1991), p. 86.
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Modern submunition weapons consist of two main types-those delivered by
aircraft, and those by surface artillery or rockets. 38 Weapons carrying
submunitions disperse them over a large area, thereby increasing the impact area
of an attack. The large number delivered in a dispenser increases the density of
explosives in a target area, with submunitions designed to strike every few feet or
so. An artillery or rocket barrage, or an air attack, typically can disperse thousands
of submunitions within a small space, a common target area in planning roughly
being an area lOOx50 meters. Obviously, an attractive feature for militaries is that
the submunitions are inexpensive given the area of destructive potential in
comparison with unitary explosives.
Even though weapons are being designed to be more and more "reliable," because
submunitions are used in such large numbers, "reliability" as it relates to unexploded
ordnance and environmental damage on the battlefield (and in civilian locations when
cluster bombs are chosen for an urban attack) has actually declined (within the context
of otherwise discriminate attacks). As the use of smaller and smaller munitions
increases, more and more numbers are expended in battle. The large number of
weapons, individually less expensive, intentionally more expendable and simply
designed, creates more of a lingering problem. Small, inexpensive electronic fuses are
more prone to malfunction under severe conditions.
In the Gulf War, cluster bombs delivered from medium and high altitudes
experienced "excessively high dud rates.,,39 Despite contact fuses and secondary
firing systems, an enormous number failed to detonate, particularly when landing
in soft sand and shallow water or mud. Ground-delivered (e.g., artillery or rocket)
submunitions also experienced high dud rates. Estimates vary from the
conservative 2-5 percent claimed by manufacturers, to up to 23 percent observed
in acceptance and operational tests, to an average onO-30 percent observed on the
ground after the war in Iraq and Kuwait. 40 Even a conservative five percent
estimate means that some 2.2 million unexploded bomblets were left behind,
almost half from air-delivered bombs.
With the proliferation ofremotely delivered sub munitions, both air and ground
delivered, emplacement of mines by the individual soldier is increasingly a less
important theater operation in high technology warfare. Air-delivered cluster
bombs and scatterable artillery-, helicopter-, or rocket-delivered submunitions
will predominate in the future. There are a number of implications from this
"advancement:" placement is by necessity more random, more driven by
short-term considerations on the battlefield given the flexibility of the weapon.
Well over one million anti-tank, anti-personnel, and sea mines were emplaced
by Iraq in the Gulf War. In terms of clean up, the difference between cluster bombs
and mines is that grossly insufficient procedures and requirements exist to recover
unexploded bomblets scattering the battlefield. With ground- and air-delivered
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submunitions, there are no restrictions and the very nature of the weapons often
defies precise mapping of their expenditure.
During the Cold War, the military was less concerned about submunition
placement and dud rates because weapons were developed to defend against a
Soviet offensive in Western Europe, one which would not have required U.S.
soldiers to occupy "submunition-contaminated" areas.41 With the large scale use
of sub munitions in a rapidly moving offensive battlefield, such as the Gulf War,
however, friendly hazards were immediately felt. One government study
concluded that during Operation Desert Storm at least 25 U.S. military personnel
were killed and others were injured by submunitions fired by their own forces. 42
Troops with the U.S. 1st Armored Division, for example, said that the principal
threat they faced was "unexploded ordnance believed to have been left over
from ... earlier American bombardment.,,43 The situation was so critical that
large scale use of cluster bombs by aircraft was restricted during the ground war
for fear of friendly casualties44 and, in some instances, "ground movement came
to a halt because units were afraid of encountering unexploded ordnance.,,45
In the immediate aftermath of Operation Desert Storm, unexploded
submunitions killed or injured more than 100 soldiers and military explosive
disposal specialists.46 Post-war injuries to U.S. soldiers from unexploded ordnance
on the battlefield, particularly because of the excessive "dud rate" of
ground-launched submunitions, became so serious that Congress requested that
the General Accounting Office (GAO) investigate manufacturing, purchasing and
handling.47
The military effectiveness of submunitions varies, but it far from clear that
either ground- or air-delivered submunitions, or land mines, have advantages that
outweigh the human and environmental impact. Aerial cluster bombs proved
ineffective in the armor attack role during the Gulf War, and with the emergence
of a wide variety of precision anti-tank weapons, they seem less and less attractive
weapons for such attacks in the future (particularly where U.S. forces have to
operate). Use of cluster bombs against urban targets, given the constraints of
restricting collateral damage and civilian effects, seems counterproductive.
Indeed, cluster bombs used in strategic bombing attacks proved a bit of a nuisance.
Given their properties of small explosions and broad dispersal, they greatly
complicated battle damage assessment as the noticeable impact on stationary
targets (as opposed to larger explosives of 500-2,000 pound class) was difficult to
assess via reconnaissance.
There are circumstances in which the use of cluster bombs might be beneficial
in terms oflimiting collateral and reverberating damage. In the Vietnam War, for
instance, cluster bombs were used to attack anti-aircraft artillery guns that had
been placed on embankments and dikes in the north. The guns could be
suppressed without doing harm to the irrigation and water control structures.
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The large scale use ofIraqi mines also proved more of a nuisance than a decisive
military instrument. Mines, in order to be effective against modern forces, need
to be maintained and protected by covering fire, and are therefore not as attractive
for large scale use by sophisticated militaries as are submunitions. In fact, the new
generation of scatterable mines (delivered from artillery, aircraft and ground
dispensers) which entered arsenals in the 1980's will likely replace hand-sown
mines in the future. These can be mass emplaced in mobile or tactical settings,
and employ influence sensors and electronic timers.
When submunitions and mines are evaluated for their military effect in many
missions-particularly given the emergence and success of smart weapons-or
when their use is measured against the collateral effects, they are far less attractive.
The effects are immediate and measurable. In the case of depleted uranium (DU)
as an anti-tank weapon, the effects are more subtle.
Depleted uranium is used in armor penetrators, both in bullets shot from
aircraft (and ship-based gattling guns) and in tank ammunition. 48 Because of
uranium's density and physical properties, it is attractive as an alternative to
tungsten or other more expensive metals. In the Gulf War, about 14,000 DU tank
rounds were consumed (4000 fired in combat) and 940,254 30mm DU bullets were
fired by A-10 aircraft.49 The health and environmental risks remain unclear; the
U.S. Army itself states that there is a "n~ed for more data on potential health and
environmental consequences associated with the chemical and radiological
characteristics ofDU."sO A January 1993 GAO report found thattheArmy did not
have a comprehensive DU battlefield management plan.S1
As a result of medical screening at the end of the war, some 35 soldiers were
found to have traces of uranium in their urine. ApPi'oximately 22 soldiers may
have retained embedded DU fragments. Early in reporting on the so-called "Gulf
War syndrome," DU was identified as a possible contributing factor to the
unexplained illnesses being reported by veterans (and was the subject of
considerable Iraqi propaganda).s2 Though no one now believes that DU is
ultimately causal, the Army admits that the long-term health effects have not been
well defined,S3 and the proliferation of DU weapons to other nations will
undoubtedly increase whatever risks do exist.
The latest thinking on the "Gulf War syndrome," in fact, is that a syndrome as
such does not exist. A comprehensive U.S. Department of Defense surveyoflO,OOO
veterans and family members found no link to biological or chemical weapons,
environmental pollutants, hazardous chemicals, depleted uranium, oil well fires,
vaccines, or diseases unique to the desert. Undoubtedly, at least amongst the
veterans groups and a segment of the population, Gulf War syndrome will join
missing in actions (MIAs) in Southeast Asia or even UFO's as grand "cover-ups"
of the government. Yet it is the long list of potential or even suspected toxins that
is interesting. Far more work is needed to understand the emergence of new
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technologies or the interaction of certain substances uniquely found on the
battlefield in terms of the human and natural environmental impact.
Though environmental "modification" has been a subject of discussion for
many years, newer technologies may actually be increasing the attractiveness of
use of the environment for warfare. Despite U.S. denials, enough documentation
exists to indicate that the Iraqi-perpetrated oil conflagration and the creation of
significant amounts ofsmoke had a significant impact on U.S. air operations, Iraqi
intentions or not. Laser-guided bombs and other sensor-dependent weapons (e.g.,
television, electro-optical, and infrared) are severely constrained by atmospheric
conditions. In the Gulf War, many laser-guided weapons were unable to acquire
targets because ofadverse weather conditions (i.e., rain and fog), and optical guided
weapons were definitely constrained by the smoke of oil fires. The conditions were
both natural and man-made. For instance, smoke pots were used to obscure targets
and had an effect on target acquisition and bombing.
In addition, night vision devices are dependent on a certain environmental
condition. That is, it has to be dark. In the Gulf War, oil well and trench fires,
even fires caused by routine bombing, caused havoc with night-vision devices. The
combined effect was obscuring nearly all natural ambient light, which night-vision
devices need for illumination. By contrast, too much light causes a sort of
"blooming" effect.54 Perhaps in the face of night attacks, a future countermeasure
would be the large scale creation of certain types of illuminations that would not
expose friendly forces.
As "smart" weapons become more commonplace, perhaps the countermeasures
to smart weapons guidance systems-including modifying atmospheric
conditions55-will be an important part of a nation's defense. Thus the
weapons/counter-weapons battle, coupled with more discriminate precision
weapons and urban bombing constraints, as well as new concepts of information
("systemic") warfare, could serve to make the potential for devastation or
disablement of civilian systems, with inadvertent environmental damage, even
worse in the future.
It may be important to reaffirm the original intent of the ENMOD
Convention,56 to strengthen the disarmament effect in the face of advances in
military technology, as well as to more rigorously define environmental damage
that might (or should be) applicable. Yet advances in military technology were not
even discussed at the 1993 ENMOD Convention review conference.57

Legal Protections for Environmental Destroyers?
A number of international agreements have been developed over the years with
the very goal oflimiting damage to the environment during war. Until the 1970s,
treaties relating to the conduct of war focused on humans and their property.
Provisions of the laws of war dealing with military necessity and proportionality
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related to the environment, but then attitudes began to change and environmental
consequences began to be questioned as something other than the otherwise
inevitable accompaniment of military action.
Though armed conflict is always a tragedy for the environment, in the Gulf
War, there was a perception prior to Operation Desert Storm that the venue for
war, and the intensity of modern weapons, would mean that the war would be more
environmentally destructive. But since global calamity did not occur, and the war's
end was not defined, the environment was made subordinate to the political needs
of the victorious States.
Some would think that the environmental destruction that did occur might
serve as a catalyst to bring the various agreements, laws, and proposals under
review. But this has so far not been the case. There has been a lot of procedural
wrangling, yet with the snuffing out of the last oil fire, and the shift of television's
gaze away from the Gulf, interest in any real change also was extinguished.
In civil society, a nation is now, in theory, to be held responsible for the
environmental damage it causes. But we have not yet arrived at the point of any
punishment for actions during warfare, let alone any clarity as to the illegality of
the acts perpetrated. Over the years, a lack of enforcement against Iraqi use of
chemical weapons and other grave breaches may have signalled to the Ba'athist
Government that "international law" is a matter for posturing and propaganda,
and not action. 58 When napalm or others weapons are used experimentally or
cynically as examples to avoid restrictions in international humanitarian law,
similarly the message to other nations is that the secrecy surrounding them and
their use might be proof of their worth, as well as signs of American duplicity in
its compliance with international law.
The destruction of Kuwait's oil resources and Iraq's electrical production were
both done intentionally, both with precision. The juxtaposition of the two is
merely to illustrate that one is clearly "illegal" and the other is not. The massive
oil spills and oil fires polluted air, land, and water, threatening fisheries, ocean
ecology, and public health. The bombing of electricity started a cascade of misery
for the Iraqi civilian population, severely affecting irrigation, water treatment,
sanitation, and agriculture. The boundary between "property damage" as specified
in the law of war and natural (e.g., environmental) damage is increasingly thin.
Most in the humanitarian and environmental community have argued that the
scale of the oil spills and fires constitutes a breach of international law. However,
to focus solely on scale leaves unresolved the main issue of contention between the
military establishment and the humanitarian community, the presumption of
military necessity. Regardless of scope, there is no evidence that the performance
of Iraqi military forces was degraded by the loss of electricity. This is not to say
that there was no effect, it is just that it is difficult to assert that a calculation of
the destruction of the civilian utility can be shown to have "definite military
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advantage." Despite numerous annoyances, the oil spills and fires also did not
create any definable military advantage for Iraq.
None of this is to set up a counter-legal analysis. The codified law is useful to
set the parameters that might constrain military operations to improve protections
for the civilian population and the environment. Yet it is the political and public
opinion constraints that are much more important in terms of cutting edge
technologies or new situations. On close examination, the record of the Gulf War
shows that when military leaders or Washington decision makers restricted
destruction, they did so largely to avoid adverse public opinion, not because
technicalities in the law were the issues of concern.
Greater awareness of environmental "stewardship" and pollution prevention
by soldiers and commanders has created an obvious ethos of responsibility for
long-term effects of operations, and a receptiveness to limitations. 59 There is no
doubt that the very nature of modern society-urbanized, industrialized,
increasingly dependent on electrically-driven amenities-makes it more
vulnerable to disruptions. "A strategic center of gravity for most States beyond the
agrarian stage is the power generation system," Colonel John A. Warden, the air
war principal designer, wrote after Operation Desert Storm. "Without electrical
power, production of civil and military goods, distribution of food and other
essentials, civil and military communications, and life in general becomes difficult
lO impossible. Unless the stakes in the war are very high, most States will make
desired concessions when their power generation system is put under sufficient
pressure or actually destroyed.,,60
The Gulf War thus should portend the kind of damage we might see in the
future. Mass destruction weapons did not kill masses, precision weapons did. The
successful and precise destruction of intended targets had a devastating effect on
the civilian population, one more reminiscent of bombing associated with
old-style urban attacks and not a squeaky clean smart war. Environmental calamity
on a global scale seems to have been avoided, but the very efficiency of harm, and
the lingering impact of such a short conflict, should portend the potential for war's
greater potential for destructiveness.
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